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2.1  Introduction 
There is a widespread perception that American international competitive- 
ness is declining and that American economic leadership is under threat. In- 
creased attention is being directed toward the contribution that vocational edu- 
cation and training might be able to make to a solution of these problems. In 
this context, the British system of youth training, which has undergone consid- 
erable changes in recent years, may offer some object lessons. It is now gener- 
ally accepted that Britain lags behind its European partners in the provision of 
training to young people who are unable or unwilling to continue in full-time 
academic education after they have reached the minimum legal age for leaving 
school. In comparisons of high-level manpower (first-degree level or above), 
Britain compares favorably. But the proportion of the labor force who have 
attained lower- or intermediate-level vocational qualifications is far lower in 
Britain than in France and lower still than in Germany (Prais 1981; Steedman 
1990; Steedman, Mason, and Wagner 1991). Moreover, case studies of a num- 
ber of industries in manufacturing and elsewhere, using matched samples of 
plants, have shown that low skill levels in the United Kingdom are a significant 
cause of lower labor productivity (Daly, Hitchens, and Wagner 1985; Prais, 
Jarvis, and Wagner 1989; Steedman and Wagner 1987, 1989). 
Any system of youth vocational training must confront and solve three prob- 
lems: First, who is to pay for training? Second, how is the content of training 
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to be determined? And third, how is the skill level of a trained individual to be 
appraised and certificated? The solution to the financing problem is in prin- 
ciple straightforward. Since (in the absence of externalities) it is the trainee 
who by and large benefits, in the shape of higher wages, the trainee should pay 
for the cost of his own training (Becker 1964, chap. 2). But in practice there 
are difficulties since trainees are young (not legally adults) and may well not 
be creditworthy. In the first instance, therefore, firms may  have to bear the 
burden, hoping to recoup the costs later. But this gives rise to obvious prob- 
lems. If trainees wages are too high, firms will lack incentive to offer training. 
If wages are kept low throughout the training period, the “poaching” problem 
arises, whereby a firm which offers training does not get to reap the reward of 
its investment when a nontraining firm lures away its trainees; the incentive for 
firms to train is again reduced, 
With  the  content  of  training,  there  are two  issues. The training  offered 
should obviously be up-to-date and relevant to the industry in which the trainee 
is working. Experience shows that this is usually best achieved by workplace- 
based training. But since 16-year-olds (16 being the school-leaving age in Brit- 
ain) cannot possibly know for sure what their aptitudes, abilities, and opportu- 
nities are, the training offered should be also designed to encourage flexibility 
and  lay a  sound foundation  enabling  trainees  to deal  with  possible  future 
changes in their occupations and indeed future changes in technology in their 
current career choice. In other words,  vocational  training should include an 
element of general education (primarily, literacy and numeracy). Firms are ob- 
viously in the best position to say what is relevant training given the current 
technology of their industry. But if firms determine training content, they have 
little incentive to offer training designed to advance the trainee’s ability  to 
move into a different industry or a different occupation. If on the other hand 
the government determines the content of the training curriculum, it may be 
able to ensure that general education is not neglected, but it may find it difficult 
to ensure that the more narrowly vocational element is truly relevant to indus- 
try’s current needs, let alone its future ones. 
As regards assessment and certification,  it is obviously in the interests of 
trainees that at the end of  their training period they should be able to gain a 
certificate which is widely recognized-which  is regarded as a reliable indica- 
tor of the skill level to which it attests-and  that the attested skill should be 
economically relevant. It is clearly in society’s interest as well. An atomistic 
system in  which each  firm offers  training  and  bestows  its own  certificates 
would obviously not meet the above requirements: some external body (though 
not necessarily a governmental one) is required to lay down and monitor stan- 
dards. 
The three problems are interdependent, so that failure to solve one exacer- 
bates the difficulties caused by  the other two. For example, if trainee wages 
are set too high, firms will find ways to skimp on training, so that the value of 
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tory, trainees will be reluctant to come forward, except for wages which firms 
find excessive, thus worsening the financing problem. If the content of training 
courses is not relevant to the skills required by the market, then the value of 
the certificate will be reduced and trainees will again be discouraged. 
The British system of youth training has seen great changes in the last de- 
cade, as we describe below. Nevertheless, it is our claim that the current system 
is still far from achieving a satisfactory solution to the threefold problem of 
finance, content, and certification. Britain  still has  much to learn from the 
French system, and still more from the German one, which (we shall argue) 
comes the closest of the three to a socially optimal solution. 
Our argument is laid out as follows. First, we describe the main features of 
the training systems of Britain and Germany, making in passing some remarks 
on the rather different French system. Next we set out a simple model of youth 
training,  designed  to illuminate the relationship  between  trainee  and  adult 
wage rates implicit in an economically viable system. Armed with these in- 
sights, we then try to evaluate the outcomes in Britain and Germany.’ 
2.2  Britain and Germany Compared 
2.2.1  The British System 
Youth training in the United Kingdom has traditionally been provided by 
the apprenticeship system. Even in its heyday, only a minority of young people 
(from among those not in full-time education) served apprenticeships. Appren- 
ticeships bestowed a narrow craft type of qualification, though a well-accepted 
one. In many industries moreover the apprenticeship system consisted of mere 
timeserving, with no testing of  competence required for successful comple- 
tion. The 1980s proved a watershed. Under the impact of the 1980-81 reces- 
sion, the intake into apprenticeship declined dramatically: the number serving 
apprenticeships in manufacturing halved between 1979 and 1984 and fell by a 
further third between 1984 and 1989 (U.K. Department of Employment 1990, 
table A1.lO). Faced with rapidly rising unemployment, which (by the OECD 
definition) was to reach 12.4 percent by  1983, and at a time when the number 
of  16-17-year-olds was increasing sharply, so that mass youth unemployment 
1. Many of  the issues of policy addressed in this article have also been discussed by Marsden 
and Ryan (1991) and by Finegold (1991). Marsden and Ryan  acknowledge the importance of 
achieving a trainee wage level which will encourage employers to train while emphasizing the 
need for trade unions to be accorded a role in the regulation of training quality in Britain as is the 
case in Germany. Finegold also emphasizes the importance of institutions in promoting a high- 
volume, high-quality training equilibrium, in particular the role of  the German chambers of com- 
merce in providing the cooperative forum where training places can be brokered and “poaching” 
problems confronted. In this article we adopt a different approach to the same issues. Starting 
from the premise that institutions are notoriously difficult to “grow” on foreign soil, we concen- 
trate primarily on ways of establishing strong incentives for employers to train and for individuals 
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was in prospect, the government introduced the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). 
A placement with a firm under YTS was initially for one year. Now renamed 
simply Youth Training (YT), placements are (since 1986) for two years, though 
there is no penalty for the trainee who leaves early. Under the YT program, the 
government covers the cost of college fees and pays firms a modest subsidy.* 
Firms are in turn required to provide work experience and to ensure that train- 
ees “work toward” vocational qualifications. Firms must also pay trainees the 
“trainee allowance” laid down by the government, though they are not pre- 
vented from paying more, and in practice many do. The trainee allowance is 
about the same amount as a single adult could claim on social security. The 
government has pledged to provide trainee places under YT for all 16-1 8-year- 
olds who want them-this  is the carrot. The stick is that the government has 
now abolished the entitlement of young people to social security benefits, so 
that YT is also a large-scale experiment in “workfare.” 
The assessment and certification of vocational qualifications is regulated by 
the National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ), set up in  1986. 
This body has classified qualifications into four National Vocational Qualifi- 
cation (NVQ) Levels. Payment of the trainee allowance to firms is conditional 
on the trainee being deemed to be “working towards” a qualification classed 
as NVQ Level 2. The term “working towards” has not as yet received a precise 
official definition-it  does not require for example that the trainee attend col- 
lege part-time (though that would be usual). Moreover, determining whether a 
trainee has  achieved  NVQ Level  2 does not require  an  externally  set and 
graded exam, but merely  an assessment in the college or workplace by  the 
trainee’s  own college lecturer or supervisor without necessarily  any written 
test. The lack of external assessment and the failure to require the passing of a 
written test are strongly at variance with practice elsewhere in Europe (Prais 
1989, 1991). It appears too that NCVQ is squeezing out the general educa- 
tional element from the vocational syllabus, in favor of a collection of narrowly 
defined “skills,” such as the ability to answer the teleph~ne.~ 
By  1990, 23 percent of  16-year-olds in Great Britain were on YT, and 21 
percent of  17-year-olds. However, only 2 percent of  18-year-olds were on YT. 
Overall,  15 percent of young people in the 16-18  age group were on YT; this 
compares with 36 percent of the age group who were still in full-time educa- 
tion, the remaining 49 percent being employed, unemployed, or inactive (U.K. 
Department  of  Employment  1992). Since YT  placements  are now  for  two 
2. The administration of  YT has been devolved by the Employment Department onto the newly 
created Training and Education Councils (TECs). These in turn pay the money in the first instance 
to “managing agents” whose role is to recruit trainees and place them with firms, while also ar- 
ranging suitable college-based training on a part-time (day-release) basis. Levels of payment to 
firms taking trainees vary both within and between TECs. In one area, the subsidy paid to firms, 
we were informed, was f8  per trainee per week in 1991. 
3. Steedman (1992) found that the NCVQ-approved syllabus for trainees in the construction 
industry required no mathematics, unlike the corresponding syllabuses in France and Germany. 65  The British System of  Youth Training:  A Comparison with Germany 
years, these figures suggest that a large proportion of trainees do not complete 
the course. In fact, data from the Youth Cohort Study (reported in U.K. Depart- 
ment of Employment 1992) indicates that of those 19-year-olds  in employment 
in  1989 who had previously done YT, only 40 percent had done the full two 
years4 
2.2.2  The French and German Systems 
In the process of achieving a considerably higher supply of training places, 
France and Germany have adopted different strategies which arise from very 
different labor market institutions and from differing arrangements for the con- 
trol of education. In France, the supply of training places for 16-19-year-olds 
is regulated by  funds made available by  the government to full-time further 
education colleges and by Ministry of Education determination of the occupa- 
tional spread and level of  courses available. The disadvantages of  securing 
supply in this way are well documented (Jarvis and Prais 1989). Provision re- 
sponds to labor market requirements sluggishly and with considerable time 
lags, and course content is divorced from current labor market needs. The ben- 
efits to employers are largely in the form of young employees with good techni- 
cal and vocational grounding in a specific occupational area and with a sound 
foundation of basic education. French training provision is characterized by a 
high level of  supply and uneven quality (poorly adapted to immediate labor 
market requirements but with consistently satisfactory levels of general voca- 
tional education). 
Germany relies on employers voluntarily coming forward to provide training 
places5 This source of supply has important advantages not easily attainable 
when  places are state-funded in full-time colleges as in France. Employers 
offering training places do so according to their own projections of manpower 
requirements with the result that the occupational areas in which training is 
provided more closely match labor market  opportunities. The provision of 
training in the workplace ensures that specific training in vocational skills cor- 
responds to current workplace standards. It might be expected that, in such an 
arrangement, general vocational education would be marginalized. This is not 
the case, however, since it is an obligatory part (for both employers and train- 
ees) of any apprenticeship contract that an element of general vocational edu- 
cation be provided to a syllabus drawn up  by  regional education authorities 
and be financed by those authorities. The result is a high-quality, high-supply 
equilibrium in both vocational training and vocational education areas. 
Under a typical German apprenticeship, one day a week will be devoted to 
full-time study at a vocational college in  each year of the three-year training 
period. Some apprenticeships require the whole of the first year to be spent in 
4. Of those 19-year-olds in employment in 1989,30  percent had gone straight from school into 
5. See Soskice (chap. 1 in this volume) for a detailed discussion of the German system. 
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full-time study. During the remainder of the time, the trainee will be working 
for the firm but very often in a special training workshop on the firm’s prem- 
ises. It is important to realize that successful completion of an apprenticeship, 
which is widely seen by young people as the essential route to a decent job, 
requires the passing of externally set and assessed exams. But the exam sylla- 
bus is based not only on what has been learned at college but also on what has 
been learned in the firm. 
The syllabus for vocational training is the result of a detailed consultative 
process involving business, unions, and the state governments (Lander). Be- 
cause of this, the important distinction in the German system is not between 
Becker’s general and specific training, but between general education with a 
vocational orientation and the acquisition of workplace skills. Given the age of 
the trainees, the small size of many of  the firms involved, and the training 
syllabus, it is simply not realistic to regard any significant part of training as 
firm specific for most trainees, though an important part of it is industry spe- 
cifi~.~  The interesting question is, How narrowly vocational is the supposedly 
general educational part of the apprenticeship? The view of  teachers in the 
German vocational colleges (Berufschuk),  all with previous occupational and/ 
or professional experience, was that, of the mathematical knowledge acquired 
in college courses, the apprentices would need to use only a small part directly 
in the workplace while employed as craftsmen. They would, however, need the 
whole range of mathematical skills if at a later stage they proceeded, as some 
were expected to do, to take courses and examinations leading to positions as 
supervisors (Meisters)  or technicians (Te~hnikers).~  In other words, these skills 
are more likely to be of use to the trainee as a means of  pursuing career goals 
than directly in current employment. 
In general, the training program which German employers agree to put train- 
ees through, if they take them on as apprentices, not only includes off-the-job 
education and training but goes far beyond the training directly required for 
the job in hand. We can, for example, contrast the six-week training commonly 
given to sewing machinists in Britain, which is considered sufficient to teach 
them the basic operations required, with the two-year training given to machin- 
ists in Germany (Steedman and Wagner 1989). 
At first glance, the German apprenticeship scheme, with its requirement that 
the employer send the trainee to college for at least one day a week or the 
equivalent, while paying a trainee wage, would appear to involve subsidization 
by the employer of general training. How can we explain the willingness of 
6.  A small number of  “elite” apprenticeships in high-skill occupations offered by some large 
firms, e.g., engineering apprenticeships with Siemens, may give an implicit promise of long-term 
employment and may consequently contain an important element of firmspecific training. But it 
should be remembered that about a third of all apprenticeships are in the handwerk sector (e.g., as 
hairdressers and motor vehicle mechanics) and that, even of  those in Industrie und Hundel, many 
are with small and medium-sized companies (e.g., as retail salespersons). 
7. This view  emerged in recent discussions held with a number of  teachers working in  Re- 
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German employers to enter into a training agreement where the on-the-job 
training they must supply (in accordance with federally agreed training pro- 
grams) goes far beyond the specific skills required for the job at hand? To start 
with, we can note that the German state government (Land),  not the employer, 
bears all the costs of off-the-job tuition in the vocational college. Second, the 
trainee wage is  substantially below the corresponding adult rate: typically, 
trainees earn only about a third of  the basic pay  of the corresponding adult 
worker (Jones 1985; his data refer to  1979, but there has been little change 
since then). Third, the trainee makes a productive contribution in the latter 
stages of  the training contract, and the employer can be reasonably certain 
(because of the importance trainees attach to possession of the craft certificate, 
Berufsabschluss)  that the trainee will in fact remain with the firm for the full 
training period. A fourth factor helping to explain trainees’ acceptance of  a 
low trainee wage is that the training period varies with the nature of the job. 
Clearly, the length of time needed to acquire a minimum level of job-specific 
skills will vary from occupation to occupation. As a general rule in Germany, 
the shorter the time required to acquire the particular job-specific skills, the 
shorter the total training period-for  example, an office assistant (Burogehil- 
fin) has a two-year training period, whereas an office clerk (Burokuufluu) has 
a three-year training period. This variation in the length of the training period 
as a function of the required degree of  skill helps to keep the trainee dropout 
rate relatively low.* 
In summary, the fact that the German system has survived the economic 
strains of recent years, that it continues to meet with a high level of acceptance 
from German firms, small and medium-sized, as well as large, and that it suc- 
ceeds in providing apprenticeships for the vast majority of the target popula- 
tion (less than 5 percent of  German young people age 15-18  are in neither 
training nor full-time education; Bundesminister fur Bildung und Wissenschaft 
1990b, 24-25)  strongly suggests that it is privately profitable. In the next sec- 
tion, we draw out the implications of what we take to be this fact. 
2.3  The Economics of Youth Training 
2.3.1  A Simple Model 
In this section we  develop a simple model of  youth training, designed to 
illustrate the problems with which all real-world training systems which rely 
on the private sector, as does Germany’s, have to contend. For the reasons given 
earlier, we assume that all training is general. 
8. In  1988, the proportion of apprenticeships which were not completed was 20.5 percent, up 
from 13.7 percent in 1983. Most of these “dropouts” are in fact switching from one apprenticeship 
to another. The rise in the noncompletion rate has been attributed to the tighter labor market for 
young people in these years, which has enabled them to be choosier (Bundesminister fur Bildung 
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It is assumed that the firm is required  to sign a binding contract with  its 
trainees for a period of n months, where for example, n = 36 in the typical 
German case. During month t trainees would have a marginal product y, if they 
devoted  all  of  their  working  time  to  production.  However,  they  devote 
a proportion h, of working time to off-the-job training, so their actual marginal 
product is (1 -  h,)y,. In the earlier part of  the training period, this marginal 
product will normally be less than the wage cost to the firm  w,.  Obviously, 
therefore, firms will never offer training unless they expect that at some point 
the marginal product will exceed the wage cost. 
Since the  contract  is binding  for  n  periods,  employers must  look  at the 
profitability of the contract as a whole, not month by month. But they need not 
look beyond the end of the contract, since at the end of the contract employees 
are free to leave and employers are also free to let the former trainees go and to 
hire someone  else. Roughly speaking, the firm must ask, Does the present value 
of the benefits over the life of the contract exceed the present value of the costs? 
Although the contract is binding, it is nevertheless possible that its terms are 
not fulfilled. For example, if we continue to look at it from the firm’s point of 
view, the worker may quit or do something which necessitates dismissal (e.g., 
assault a manager). Hence the firm must allow for the possibility  that it will 
incur expenditure on labor costs in the earlier months, the worker will then 
leave, and the firm will never get the benefit of higher output. 
Let p,  be the probability, as of the beginning of the contract, that the worker 
is still with the firm in period t.  Then the training contract is profitable for the 
firm (assuming risk neutrality) if 
where r is the firm’s required rate of return on capital. 
Several conclusions arise from considering this formula. Note first that the 
contract would always be profitable to the firm if the wage were equal to the 
marginal product in every period, i.e., if  (1 -  h,)y, = w,,  for all t. This is of 
course the point made by Becker (1964, chap. 2). It is easy to see however that 
this is not the practice followed in the real world: on the last day of apprentice- 
ship, workers are presumably almost as productive as on the following day, but 
they are paid substantially less than adult workers. The most plausible explana- 
tion for this is that if wages were strictly in accordance with marginal produc- 
tivity, they might be unacceptably low during the earlier stages of the appren- 
ticeship. To keep from starving, workers would have to rely on borrowing or 
family support which might not be forthcoming. For example, banks in the 
United Kingdom are at the time of writing (March 1992) charging a real rate 
of  interest of  about  25  percent  for small, unsecured  loans  (a few hundred 
pounds), and this when most of their customers have assets which could be 
distrained on in case of default. Trainees are not legally adults and usually have 
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may be little better placed to acquire outside finance. In addition, if commercial 
loans existed there would be a moral hazard problem:  firms would have no 
incentive to screen out unsuitable  applicants for training. It is not therefore 
hard  to  see why  special  arrangements for financing  the training  of  young 
people are necessary. In the absence of commercial loans, firms in effect lend 
trainees money by paying them more than their marginal product at the start 
of the contract, a debt which trainees “repay” by accepting a wage lower than 
their marginal product as their skill level rises. 
A second point to note is that the higher the probability of the employee 
dropping out (the lower p,),  the lower trainee wages must be (in relation to 
productivity) in order to make the contract profitable for the employer. In ear- 
lier times, the problem of default on the part of the trainee was taken so seri- 
ously that runaway apprentices were treated as criminals. In modern Germany, 
the contract is somewhat one-sided in that it is binding on the employer but 
there are no significant legal consequences for the trainee if he or she quits 
prematurely (though there may be serious consequences for the trainee’s future 
job prospects). 
One should also note that the fact that these are not lifetime contracts makes 
a great deal of difference to trainee wages. If  lifetime contracts existed, we 
should see a much smaller gap between the wages of  trainees and those of 
fully trained workers, since the cost of training, which is borne ultimately by 
workers, could then be spread over a whole working life instead of being in- 
curred entirely in the relatively short training period. With lifetime contracts, 
the same formula applies but with n interpreted as the length of working life, 
not of the training period. Certain “elite” apprenticeships may give entry to an 
internal labor market and may therefore be analyzable as an implicit lifetime 
contract, but such apprenticeships are a minority, even among those offered by 
large firms. 
2.3.2  Implications for the Trainee-Adult Wage Differential 
The profitability condition  (1)  can be used to generate some implications 
for the differential between trainee and adult wages. Alternatively, given the 
differential, we can deduce implications  for the sustainable level of  human 
investment. This condition was derived for an individual firm, but competition 
will ensure that  in  the long run  it holds  for all firms in an industry  as an 
equality: 
To obtain numerical results, it is necessary to impose some structure on equa- 
tion (2).  Specifically, we assume that the trainee wage and the proportion of 
time devoted to training stay constant throughout the training period (w,  = w 
and h, = h, for all t), and that the probability of  a trainee dropping out is 
constant and equal to  1 -  p, so that pt = p‘. We  also need to say how the 70  Nicholas Oulton and Hilary Steedman 
trainee’s marginal product grows over time. We assume that this depends on 
two factors: off-the-job training and on-the-job training. The rate at which pro- 
ductivity rises is assumed to depend in a linear fashion on the proportion of 
the trainee’s time devoted to these two a~tivities:~ 
(3)  (y, -  y,  = ph + a(1 -  h), 0 5 h I  1; p,  a  > 0. 
Note that this formulation (which as far as off-the-job training is concerned is 
the same as that of Lucas 1988) has the strong implication that the growth rate 
of marginal productivity is independent of its initial level. However, Rosen 
(1976) has shown that the optimal h depends on an “ease of learning” parame- 
ter, which in turn could be made to depend on the initial educational level of 
trainees. He has also shown that in the early period of working life the optimal 
growth rate of human capital is approximately constant. So equation (3) may 
be quite reasonable as a model of human capital investment for youth trainees. 
The parameter p can be interpreted as the gross rate of return to investment 
in off-the-job training. To  see this, note that investment in human capital in 
month t -  1 is hy,-,, which yields a return of (y, -  y,-,) thereafter. The rate of 
return, measured on a monthly basis (ignoring the distant possibilities of death 
or retirement) and gross of depreciation on human capital, is A~~/hy~-~,  which 
by equation (3) equals p. The parameter a can be interpreted as the gross rate 
of return to on-the-job training. 
Now assume that adult workers are paid their marginal product y,, which by 
equation (3) equals yo[  1 + ph + a(  1 -  h)]”.  Under these assumptions we can 
substitute from equation (3) into equation (2) and solve for the ratio of trainee 
to adult wages, wly,,: 
Table 2.1 shows some sample results of calculating the trainee/adult wage 
ratio for a range of values of the rate of return  (p) and the proportion of time 
devoted to training (h).  In these calculations, the training period is assumed to 
be 36 months (n = 36), and the dropout rate to be zero (p  = 1); these values 
are quite realistic for the German case.’O In the top panel, the possibility of on- 
9. A third force, ignored here, which leads to greater productivity, even if a person is inactive, 
is the process of physical and mental maturation. 
10. The dropout rate from the British YT program (from information provided by the Employ- 
ment Department) averages about 3 percent per month. Setting p = 0.97 in equation (4) has sur- 
prisingly little effect on the results: for example, with h = 0.5 and the rate of return set to 20 
percent per annum, the trainee/adult wage ratio falls to 42.0 percent, compared with 43.1 percent 
with p = 1. If the assumption of rkk neutrality were dropped, no doubt the dropout effect would 
be much more significant, since the majority of firms in the United Kingdom, as in Germany, only 
have a handful of trainees at any one time. The dropout rate plays the same role in equation (4) as 
the discount factor I/( 1 + r).  Consequently, the results in table 2.1 are also insensitive to changes 
in the discount rate. 71  The British System of Youth Training: A Comparison with Germany 
Table 2.1  Trainee Wages as a Proportion of Adult Rates (%) 
Rate of Return to Off-the-Job 
Training, p (% per annum) 
Time Devoted to Off-the-Job 
Training, h (%)  10.0  20.0  30.0 

















100.0  100.0  100.0 
88.6  87.3  86.0 
77.6  75.3  73.1 
66.9  63.9  61.2 
56.5  53.2  50.2 
46.4  43.1  40.1 
36.5  33.5  30.8 
27.0  24.4  22.2 
On-the-Job Training: u = p 
86.2  74.9  65.6 
71.5  67.4  59.1 
68.9  59.9  52.5 
60.3  52.4  45.9 
51.7  44.9  39.4 
43.1  37.4  32.8 
34.5  30.0  26.2 
25.8  22.5  19.7 
Source: Calculated from equation (4), with n = 36, r = 0.1,  and p = 1. 
the-job learning  (learning by  doing) is ignored, i.e., u is set equal to zero. 
Results are shown for a range of values of p. About rates of return we have no 
direct information, and the assumed rates of 20 or 30 percent may seem exces- 
sive. But the rate of return measures the increase in productivity in the chosen 
occupation (e.g., the difference between the electrical skills of an 18-year-old 
electrician after three years of  training and those of a starting, untrained  15- 
year-old) and so may not be unrealistic. In any case, it turns out that the trainee/ 
adult wage ratio is relatively  insensitive  to the assumed rate of  return. The 
principal  influence on the ratio is the proportion of  time devoted to training. 
Put the other way round, if trainee wages are about one-third of adult rates (as 
is the case in Germany), it implies that the average trainee is spending  the 
majority of his time, perhaps  as much as 60 percent  in off-the-job training 
rather than in production. By contrast, even under the traditional British ap- 
prenticeship system, trainee wages were about two-thirds of adult rates (Jones 
1985), so that if training were to break even, the amount of time devoted to 
training must have been substantially less: table 2.1 suggests that only some 
30 percent of work time would have been devoted to training.lI 
11. Even this figure may be too high since it does not take into account the fact that by tradition 
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How much would these conclusions be altered by  allowing for on-the-job 
learning? The latter provides another reason for trainee wages to be below 
adult rates. In the lower panel of  table 2.1, on-the-job learning is assumed to 
have the same rate of  return as off-the-job learning ((T = p). Clearly, the rate 
at which trainee productivity rises is now roughly doubled, but the effect on 
the trainee/adult wage ratio is comparatively slight: with a 20 percent rate of 
return to both types of training, a wage ratio of one-third implies that trainees 
are still spending more than half their time in of-the-job  training. 
The estimate that more than half of  trainee time is devoted to off-the-job 
learning may seem unrealistically high: after all, trainees typically only spend 
one day  a week at college. But off-the-job training also includes time spent 
on learning activities while on the firm’s premises. The high estimate is also 
supported by  other evidence. In a survey of more than 900 German firms, an 
expert commission found that trainees engaged in productive work for 125.5 
days out of  a total of  212.1 days on the job (i.e., excluding holidays and sick 
days) but that only some 62 percent of  the 125.5 days was devoted to actual 
production, the remainder being given over to learning activities (Sachverstan- 
digenkommission Kosten und  Finanzierung der beruflichen  Bildung  1974, 
tables 17 and 51). Thus according to this survey, German trainees devoted only 
some 37 percent of their total time on the job to actual production work. 
2.4  Conclusions 
In the last decade, there have been great changes in the British system of 
youth training. It has now been accepted that vocational training after leaving 
school is desirable for all young people not continuing into full-time higher 
education, and not just for a small elite of craftsmen. It has also been accepted 
that  a national system of  vocational qualifications is necessary, which will 
bring  some  comparability  and  quality  control  to  the  myriad  certificates 
awarded by  a variety of  private and public educational institutions. In these 
two important respects, the U.K. system has moved toward the German one. 
But in other respects the United Kingdom has recently started to move away 
from the German model and indeed from general European practice. In the 
past, overall standards attained in these countries in a variety of  occupations, 
by trainees gaining recognized craft qualifications, have been judged by previ- 
ous studies to be roughly in line with those aimed for in Britain (Prais 1981; 
Steedman 1990; Steedman et al. 1991).12 The more serious divergence from 
France and Germany has been the larger numbers trained to recognized craft 
standards and the more rapid rate of growth in these numbers in these countries 
over the past two decades. But the standards set by  NCVQ for the various 
12. The traditional British apprenticeship, when coupled with one of the recognized craft quali- 
fications, provided a  substantial  economic  return  to  its  holder, according  to the  estimates  of 
Blanchflower and Lynch (chap. 8 in this volume), based on data from the National Child Develop- 
ment Survey. In other words, these qualifications were recognized and valued in the marketplace. 73  The British System of  Youth Training: A Comparison with Germany 
“levels” into which it divides up vocational qualifications are low by continen- 
tal standards, and the methods of assessment which NCVQ is prepared to ac- 
cept are inherently unreliable and vulnerable to abuse (Prais 1991). 
Furthermore, NCVQ has recently begun to downgrade the general and tech- 
nical content of  vocational  training. A recent  study (Steedman  1992) has 
pointed to the low level of general vocational education content, relative to that 
in the rest of Europe, in the new YT qualification targets (NVQ Level 2).  This 
study was based on analysis of training for the construction industry; the phe- 
nomenon observed affects all those areas of YT dependent on government fi- 
nance. That youth training provision should incorporate general transferable 
skills, in addition to occupation-specific and industry-specific training, has 
been accepted practice in the postwar period in all European countries. Accep- 
tance has been based on the need for a degree of  equity and social justice in 
the treatment of young people in training, relative to their coevals still in full- 
time education, on the need for firm foundations for professional identity based 
on the acquisition of recognized bodies of  skill and knowledge, on the need 
for progression within-and  beyond-the  profession, trade, or industry, and 
finally, on the need in future working life for more flexible and autonomous 
working practices. Britain appears to be moving in a very different direction. 
In Britain it is employers who now have the dominant influence on the voca- 
tional curriculum for YT, since theirs is the principal voice heard in NCVQ 
and in the TECs. As far as the other actors are concerned, the government has 
more or less excluded the trade unions, because of  their perceived record of 
obstructionism, and has itself adopted a hands-off approach to the vocational 
curriculum-in  strong contrast to the detailed control it has assumed over the 
academic curriculum. Aside from the interest that local groups of  firms or 
industries may have in reducing the general educational content of the curricu- 
lum in favor of narrowly specific skills, the present arrangements give incen- 
tives to individual firms to lower standard~.’~  By contrast, we may note that 
there is every financial incentive, under the German system, for individual em- 
ployers to support trainees’ work on college courses, since failure in these 
courses means that a trainee would have to leave an apprenticeship prema- 
turely, with consequent loss to the employer of the investment in the trainee. 
Are youth wages in the United Kingdom now  sufficiently low relative to 
adult rates to make possible a high level of training? It is true that the trainee 
allowance  is  low  (equivalent to  the  social  security level),  but  the  actual 
amounts paid by  firms are often higher. Unfortunately, there are no official 
13. In an  effort to encourage the acquisition of NVQs by trainees, a bonus equal to about half 
the total government finance available for a trainee is to  be paid to the employer when the trainee 
obtains NVQ Level 2. However, the employer is also responsible for providing training to NVQ 
Level 2-either  through college courses or through training in the workplace. The NVQ assessors, 
who may  be college lecturers or  workplace employees, but  in either case indirectly or  directly 
financially dependent on employers, may therefore find themselves in a difficult position if they 
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figures on the actual wages received by those on YT, but about a third of train- 
ees are believed to have “employed status,” and so these at least must be paid 
substantially more than  the  trainee allowance.  It must be remembered  that 
firms wishing to take on YT trainees have to compete in an active market for 
youth labor (unlike in France, for example). According to the 1991 New Earn- 
ings Survey, hourly earnings of those less than  18 years old as a proportion of 
the corresponding hourly earnings for those aged 18-20  were 68 percent for 
males and 74 percent for females.I4 The temptation for a young person to drop 
out of a traineeship in favor of a “real job” is therefore strong. 
In  addition, achieving a German level of training activity in the firm may 
involve heavy set-up costs, in the shape of special facilities for trainees, time 
devoted to formulating programs of in-firm training, and “training in training” 
for supervisory personnel. Given that the qualifications to which trainees are 
working are not highly valued in the marketplace and that the extent of future 
government financial support for training is uncertain  (it is currently falling), 
it is understandable that U.K. firms should be unwilling to incur these costs. 
In conclusion, the German system, we would claim, has found effective an- 
swers to the threefold problem of finance, content, and assessment and certifi- 
cation, which we outlined earlier. The standards of German vocational training 
are high and methods of assessment are reliable. The content of the training is 
adjudged by firms to be relevant to their needs. Partly for this reason but partly 
also because of the general educational element, training is attractive to the 
trainees, far fewer of whom fail to complete their traineeship than in Britain. 
Because of this virtuous circle, the financing problem can be solved: trainees 
pay for their own training, via loans from the firms which they work for, though 
government also contributes by paying for vocational schools. By comparison 
with the German one, the U.K.  system can be characterized  as a low-level 
equilibrium  (Finegold  and  Soskice  1988). The fundamental  obstacle  pre- 
venting the United Kingdom from moving toward  a German-type  system is 
that the certificate to which the British trainee is working is of little economic 
value, first because the skill level it purports to certify is low, second because 
it is narrowly industry specific (although this may increase its value to employ- 
ers, it reduces its value to employees), and third because, due to the lack of 
external control of the assessment system, it is an unreliable indicator of an 
individual’s actual  skills.  In  consequence,  trainees  are unwilling  to accept 
much of a reduction in wages in  order to acquire such a certificate.  Given 
14. See U.K. Department of Employment, New Earnings Survey 1991 (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1991). The figures in this source for those less than 18 years old exclude most 
of those on YT. On the other hand, the figures for those aged 18-20 include those who are entering 
employment for the first time from further education, who presumably are able to obtain a higher 
wage on average than those 18-20-year-old  who entered full-time employment at age 16. Hence, 
for those who have the lowest educational qualifications, the differential between youth and adult 
rates is likely to be even smaller than the figures in the text would suggest. 75  The British System of Youth Training: A Comparison with Germany 
trainee resistance to lower wages, employers have no incentive to improve the 
quantity or quality of  the training they offer. 
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